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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Gonzalez filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting, in part, that his
guilty plea was involuntary as a result of his trial counsel's threat of violence if he did not
accept the State's plea offer.

Mr. Gonzalez asserts that the district court erred in

granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of this issue, because there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was an involuntary product of
his trial counsel's coercion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Jose Gonzalez pied guilty to
aggravated assault and misdemeanor malicious injury to property, and was sentenced
to a total unified term of five years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.5-6; see also Exhibits
(Transcripts of Entry of Plea hearing and Sentencing hearing).) Mr. Gonzalez filed a
timely petition for post-conviction relief and accompanying documentation, and the
district court granted his request for appointed counsel. (R., pp.5-71.) The district court
also granted Mr. Gonzalez's request to file an amended petition. (R., pp.93-108.)
In his amended petition, Mr. Gonzalez made the following claims,
7.
Stacey Gosnell, now known as Stacey De Pew ("Depew")
represented Petitioner at all material times herein in his Underlying
Criminal Case.
8.
Through the course of Depew's representation of Petitioner,
Petitioner informed Depew on several occasions that he wanted a trial in
the manner (sic) so as to cross-examine his accusers, to produce
evidence as to what happened during his alleged criminal acts, and to
assert potential defenses as to Petitioner's state of mind or involuntary
intoxication during all relevant times during his alleged criminal acts.
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9.
On November 26, 2013, Petitioner met with Depew in the
Jerome County Court Annex. Petitioner was held in the holding cells
behind the courtrooms, and Depew came back and visited with Petitioner
at that location.
10.
During their meeting, Depew spoke witr1 Petitioner out loud
and in the presence of other inmates, including, but not limited to Nathan
Guymon. 1
11.
During their conversation and meeting, Depew represented
to Petitioner that if he were to take the plea deal offered by the prosecutor
of one (1) year fixed with four (4) indeterminate, that he would be
guaranteed parole after one (1) year.
12.
During their meeting, Petitioner once again told Depew that
he wanted to go to trial so as to cross-examine his accusers, to produce
evidence as to what happened during his alleged criminal acts, and to
assert potential defenses as to Petitioner's state of mind or involuntary
intoxication during all relevant times during his alleged criminal acts.

13.
Depew then told Petitioner, in words or substance, that if he
did not take the deal offered by the prosecutor, that she would strangle
him.
14.
Following Depew's statements Petitioner was both afraid of
Depew in her threats, but he also lacked all confidence in Depew as his
attorney to advocate for him at trial, and as such wholeheartedly believed
that his only option in his case was to plea[d] guilty.
Following Petitioner's conversation with Depew, Petitioner
went in front of the District Court and entered a plea of guilty to
Aggravated Assault, I. C. § 18-905 and Malicious Injury to Property, I.C. §
18-7001 in accordance with a plea agreement.
15.

16.
Petitioner did not bring up the threat of violence from Depew
or his complete lack of confidence in Depew's representation to the
District Court, as he believed that he had no further options in the matter
and because he was afraid of his attorney.

1

Mr. Gonzalez attached an affidavit from Mr. Guymon to his initial pro se petition, in
which Mr. Guymon swore that on the day Mr. Gonzalez entered his guilty plea, he
witnessed trial counsel tell Mr. Gonzalez, "'After all of this, if you change your mind and
back out on me now by not taking this deal, I'm going to come through those bars and
strangle you."' (R., pp.36-37.)
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17.
Petitioner believes that his guilty plea was not voluntary or
intelligent given the facts contained herein.
18.
Had Depew not threatened Petitioner, he would not have
accepted the plea agreement with the State of Idaho and would not have
entered a guilty plea in this matter.
19.
Also, Depew misinformed Petitioner of the consequences of
the plea deal, which Petitioner did not fully understand, specifically in
relation to parole in the State of Idaho. As such, Petitioner's entering of a
guilty plea was not intelligent.
20.
Petitioner seeks recourse in this matter in asking for his
allowance to withdraw his guilty plea and further pursue trial in the
charges in his Underlying Criminal Case.
(R., pp.104-106.)
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.114-118,
144-164.) The State asserted that, even assuming that trial counsel made the threat
alleged by Mr. Gonzalez, the record demonstrates that Mr. Gonzalez's plea was not a
product of that threat, and was therefore not coerced.

(R., pp.145-158.) The State

asserted that it was not reasonable for Mr. Gonzalez to believe that his trial counsel
could actually carry out the threat, considering it was witnessed by a guard and at least
one other inmate, and bars separated the two when the threat was made. (R., p.147.)
The State further asserted that Mr. Gonzalez's statements during the entry of plea
hearing, his recitation of what happened contained in the PSI, and his statements during
the sentencing hearing, all indicate that Mr. Gonzalez entered his guilty plea voluntarily,
and that he was satisfied with trial counsel.

(R., pp.147-158.) As to Mr. Gonzalez's

claim that his plea was not intelligent due to trial counsel telling him that he was
guaranteed to be paroled after one year, the State asserted that this claim contradicts
Mr. Gonzalez's claim that he was coerced into entering his guilty plea by trial counsel's
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threat, and further asserted that the claim is not supported by any evidence.
(R., pp.158-160.)
Mr. Gonzalez filed a written reply to the State's motion for summary dismissal
and "Petitioner's Statement of Undisputed Facts, Omitted Material Facts, and Genuine
Issues of Material Fact." (R., pp.171-180, ·183-188.) Mr. Gonzalez asserted that the
remaining genuine issues of material fact were, "What affect Ms. Depew's threatening
statement and conduct in Petitioner's case had on Petitioner while he went forward to
the change of plea hearing on November 26, 2012?" and "Whether Ms. Depew was
ineffective as Petitioner's counsel when she told Petitioner that he was guaranteed
parole after onf3 year of incarceration?"

(R., p.187.)

The State filed a reply to

Mr. Gonzalez's reply arguing that he did make any assertions regarding the prejudice
prong of his claim that trial counsel told him he would be paroled after one year.
(R., pp.189-193.)
During a hearing on the State's summary dismissal motion, counsel for
Mr. Gonzalez asserted that the court should infer that he was under continuing duress
from his trial counsel's threat, "and that's something we would like to parse out in an
evidentiary hearing."

(Tr., p.4, L.15 - p.5, L.6.)

Counsel for Mr. Gonzalez further

asserted,
[A]ssuming the facts are in favor of my client, it would be this, that
th
on the 26 he was back behind in the holding cells. Ms. DePew went
back there at that time.
Through (sic) numerous times he had asked Ms. DePew to call
certain witnesses and the like, and for whatever reason Mr. Gonzalez was
not satisfied with her.
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At that time he says, "Hey, I vvant to go to trial." Ms. DePew says,
"Well, if you don't take the deal, I'm going to reach through and strangle
you." However that was characterized.
He then, in his mind, as part of his petition, he says, "Well, I don't
trust this person anymore. She's now threatened me. I not only distrust
her, but I'm scared of her.["]
He comes in and goes, well, at least in - at least the worse that can
happen to me is we go in and the state's going to be recommending
something that will, in the event the judge accepts it, will allow me - I'll be
on parole in a year. And that's if, of course, the evidentiary hearing and
everything went my client's way.
I'm not in his head. I've had an opportunity to sit down and meet
with Mr. Gonzalez on multiple times, but that's essentially what I've gotten
from him. I'm sitting next to somebody I don't trust. They're supposed to
be my attorney. I'm scared of them and but I know all I've got to lose
here is this if I go forward. And so I do believe there's enough facts, and
that's what we to essentially (sic) to parse out at an evidentiary hearing.
(Tr., p.7, L:1 p 8, L.7.) The court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1517.)
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision RE: Motion for Summary
Dismissal granting the State's motion. (R., pp.200-218.) The court took judicial notice
of the Register of Actions, the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing
hearings, the PSI and attached documents,2 and Mr. Gonzalez's Rule 35 motion and
attached documents. (R., p.202.) The court found that the transcript of Mr. Gonzalez's
entry of plea showed that the plea was entered consistently with the requirements of
Idaho Criminal Rule 11; thus, there was prima facie evidence that the plea was
voluntary and knowing. (R., pp.205-209.) The court continued,

Mr. Gonzalez has filed a motion to augment the record with a copy of his PreSentence Investigation Report and attached documents. The motion to augment is
currently pending.
2
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In this case, despite taking the facts alleged in the petition as true,
under the totality of the circumstances Petitioner's plea was not coerced
though the threat was directed at the Petitioner and his plea. In addition to
the Rule 11 (c) prima facie evidence of voluntariness discussed supra,
Petitioner's contention that the plea was a product of trial counsel's
coercion is further undermined by his own prior filings and surrounding
circumstances which are: (1) inconsistent with the alleged coercion, (2)
show an absence of well-grounded fear for his own safety, and (3) reflect
ample time and opportunity to escape the supposed danger.
(R., p.211.) After analyzing the record, the court found,
Therefore, taking the Petitioner's allegations as fact, the Petitioner
is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on coercion since an
innocent person would not have felt compelled to plead guilty in light of the
totality of the circumstances. Petitioner's claim is without merit because:
(1) the Petitioner's guilty plea was taken in accordance with I.C.R. 11 (c)
raising the presumption that it was knowing and voluntary; (2) Petitioner's
statement regarding when trial counsel threatened him is inconsistent with
court records; (3) Petitioner's contention that he was afraid of DePew
following the threat is not objectively supported by the record as he had
multiple opportunities before and after entering his plea to bring such
sincerely held fear to the attention of the Court; and (4) Petitioner had
opportunity, even assuming he was afraid of DePew, to evade the alleged
harm threatened since the coercive statement occurred while DePew and
Petitioner were physically separated. Therefore, because Gonzalez's
allegations in his Petition are disproved by evidence (and the lack thereof)
in the record he is not entitled to post-conviction relief or withdrawal his
guilty plea based on coercion by trial counsel.
(R., pp.211-214.) Regarding Mr. Gonzalez's claim that trial counsel guaranteed parole
after one year rendering his plea invalid, the court found that any alleged mistaken
characterization of the time Mr. Gonzalez would have to serve in prison did not affect
the voluntariness of the plea. 3 (R., pp.241-217.)
Mr. Gonzalez timely appealed from the district court's Judgment summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.219-220, 223-226.)

3

Mr. Gonzalez does not the summary dismissal of this claim in this appeal.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of
Mr. Gonzalez's claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, because there exists a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was a product of his
counsel's coercion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Err In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal Of
Mr. Gonzalez's Claim That His Guilty Plea Was Involuntary, Because There Exists A
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Guilty Plea Was A Product Of His
Counsel's Coercion
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gonzalez claimed that, after his trial counsel threatened to strangle him if he

did not accept the State's plea offer, he was both afraid of his trial counsel and he
lacked confidence in her. While the district court addressed Mr. Gonzalez's claim of
fear in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, the court failed to address
Mr. Gonzalez's claim that he lacked confidence in his trial counsel, and how that lack of
confidence affected the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Because there exists a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Gonzalez's guilty plea was coerced by trial
counsel's conduct, the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.

B.

Standards Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature, and like a

plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of
the claim."

Id. at 443-444.

The application must present or be accompanied by

admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the postconviction petition may be subject to dismissal.
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Id.

In addition, the post-conviction

petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (20·10).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings.

Thomas v. State, 185 P.3d 921 (Ct. App. 2008).

To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that
trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984 ); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 ('1988). Where a defendant
shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
vvould have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at 760.
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.

"A material fact has 'some logical connection with the

consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Id. On
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). '"[W]here the evidentiary facts are

not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary
judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences."'
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Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 (quoting Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 5"15, 519

(1982).) Furthermore,
"When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion
for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts."
Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991 ).)

The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 'The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry

of determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.

The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be

regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal.

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho

247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party,
and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of
the non-moving party." Vavo/d v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).

C.

The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal
Of Mr. Gonzalez's Claim That His Guilty Plea Was Involuntary, Because There
Exists A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Guilty Plea Was A
Product Of Trial Counsel's Coercion
In his amended petition, Mr. Gonzalez asserted that he was both afraid of his

attorney and lost confidence in her, as a result of her threat to strangle him if he did not
agree to accept the State's plea offer.

(R., pp.104-105.) Specifically, he stated that
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"[f]ollowing Depew's statements Petitioner was both afraid of Depew in her threats, but
he also lacked all confidence in Depew as his attorney to advocate for him at trial,
and as such wholeheartedly believed that his only option in his case was to plea
guilty." (R., p.105 (emphasis added).) Thus, Mr. Gonzalez asserted that his guilty plea
was involuntary. (R., pp.104-105.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has described the test for determining whether or not
a guilty plea is voluntary as follows:
Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three
areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense
that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced;
(2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a
jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incrirninating himself;
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading
guilty. It is clear that the voluntariness of a guilty plea can be
determined by considering all of the relevant surrounding
circumstances contained in the record.

State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Idaho
Court of Appeals has observed, "[a] plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is
improperly induced by ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 107, 110
(Ct. App.1995) (citing Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813 (1969); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho

588 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added)). "If an innocent person would have felt
compelled to plead guilty in light of the circumstances, it can properly be said that the
plea was involuntary." Spry, 127 Idaho at 110-111 (citing Mata, supra.).
The parties stipulated that trial counsel threatened Mr. Gonzalez with physical
violence if he did not take accept the State's plea offer, and stipulated that Mr. Gonzalez
was both afraid of his trial counsel and that he lacked confidence in her. (R., pp.165,
183-184.) The district court found that Mr. Gonzalez's fear of his trial counsel did not
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result in his guilty plea for multiple reasons; however, the court failed to analyze how
Mr. Gonzalez's lack of confidence in his trial counsel played into the voluntariness of his
plea. (See generally R., pp.200-2'18 (Memorandum Decision RE: Motion for Summary
Dismissal).) Mr. Gonzalez asserts that an innocent person who desires to take their
case to trial and has expressed this desire to their counsel, would nonetheless plead
guilty if that innocent person was both afraid of and lacked confidence in their trial
counsel, upon counsel threatening that innocent person with violence if they did not
accept a plea agreement.
While the district court correctly recognized that there is a rebuttable presumption
that guilty pleas entered consistently with the requirements of I.C.R. 11 (c) are voluntary
and knowing (.see R., pp.206-207 (citing Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99 (1999)), a
factual stipulation that Mr. Gonzalez was both afraid of and lost confidence in his trial
counsel due to trial counsel's threat of physical violence (see R., pp.165, 183-184 ),
surely overcomes that presumption.

As such, Mr. Gonzalez asserts that there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not his guilty plea was voluntary.
Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Gonzalez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
Judgment summarily dismissing his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, and
remand his case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.
DATED this

tti day of May,

2015.
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